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1. INTRODUCTION 
Suppose there is a set of n voters, whose task is to select a committee from a nonempty  set 
S -- {S l , . . . ,Sm} of m candidates. Each voter is to vote for exactly one candidate, and we 
assume that  the committee lected depends only on the number of votes cast for each candidate. 
Thus, any committee lected from S depends only on the proportions a i  of votes cast for each 
candidate si, i = 1 , . . . ,  m. Wi thout  loss of generality, we will assume that  S has been relabeled 
so that  a l  >_ c~2 _> . . .  _ am _> 0. Therefore, the result of the ballot can be represented as 
a part i t ion of 1 into m nonnegative parts, a = (a l , . . . ,am) ,  with a l  _> " -  >_ am >_ 0 and 
m )-~i=1 ai = 1. For example, 
a = 12' 4 '  4 '  ,0 ,0 ,0  
depicts an election in which (a multiple of) 12 votes were cast, three candidates receiving no 
votes. 
The work of the second and third authors was partially supported by the Office of Naval Research Grant N00014- 
00-1-0004. 
*Author to whom all correspondence should be addressed. 
0893-9659/01/$ - see front matter (~) 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Typeset by .hA/~S-TEX 
PII: S0893-9659(00)00154-3 
308 H.-H. BOCK et al. 
In previous papers [1,2], we proposed a committee selection method which was motivated by 
a consensus approach used in biological sequence analysis [3-5]. This method uses the idea of 
vote concentration to give a committee lection rule that returns optimal sizes (and composition) 
of committees that meet the conditions, so that the committee size is not specified before the 
election. 
In the present note, we investigate a relationship between the properties of the committee selec- 
tion flmction C, and properties of the function f which is used for measuring vote concentration. 
In fact, we find that C fulfills the properties of "minimal eligibility" and "extreme neutrality" 
(to be defined below) if and only if f is increasing and strictly concave downward. 
2. CONSENSUS RULES 
Let I I(X) denote the set of all nonempty subsets of a set X, and Pm the set of all partitions of 1 
into m nonnegative parts. We will model an election procedure described above as a consensus 
function of the form 
C:  Pm ~ H(M), 
where M = {1, . . . ,  m}. Thus, the procedure returns a set of committee sizes for each partition 
of 1. In fact, a relevant committee of size k will always consist of the k "first" candidates (i.e., 
those with the largest proportions ai), and therefore, it is sufficient o specify the set C(c~) of 
integers in {1 , . . . ,m} which are selected as committee sizes. If ]C(c~)] > 1, then our method 
returns more than one committee, and other criteria (e.g., favoring small or large committee 
size) might need to be applied to chose among them. 
As motivation for the general type of committee lection rules that we proposed, consider the 
analog of the simple plurality rule. In our setting, this is the function 
spl: Pm --~ n(M),  
such that, for all a = (Ct l , . . .  , am) E Pm and x C M, 
x j 
x C spl(c~) -' .'- 1 > 1 for all j e M, (1) 
X - -  j ' 
and x is maximum with respect o this property, so that spl(c~) = {x}. 
In general, if x is returned as the size of an elected committee, it is natural to expect hat the 
votes are highly concentrated on the members of that committee. As can be seen above,, spl uses 
an appealing measure of vote concentration: the average number of votes per committee member. 
There are some possibly adverse consequences of this choice, however. Consider the following 
example. If c~ = (0.997, 0.001,0.001, 0.001) and 3' = (0.253, 0.249, 0.249, 0.249), then spl(c~) = 
{1} = spl(-y), and we see that the spl's result for 3' fails to indicate that unelected committees of 
sizes 2, 3, and 4 have essentially the same vote concentrations a the elected committee of size 1. 
Perhaps a committee of size x should be returned only if its vote concentration significantly 
exceeds the vote concentrations of committees of other sizes. To do this, we let f : M --* !I¢ >° 
be a measure of vote concentration, where N>0 is the set of positive real numbers, and use f to 
affect vote concentration by transforming the committee sizes found in the denominators of (1). 
We will now investigate the relationships between f, which is interpreted as a measure of vote 
concentration, and a corresponding consensus rule Cy, which is defined by generalizing (1). 
DEFINITION 2.1. Let f : M --* ~>0 be a measure of vote concentration. The consensus rule 
associated with f is the consensus function 
Cf :Pm --+ n(M),  
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such that, for all a = (O i l , . . . , am)  •Pm and x • M,  
z j 
1 1 x • cs (~)  ¢=* ~ > 
- f ( j )  
for all j • M.  
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(2) 
x c cs (a )  ~ z = px(a) .  
MINIMAL ELIGIBILITY (ME). Candidates without votes should not be on committees,  i.e., 
z • Cs(a)  ~ ax > o. 
NONTRIVIALITY (NT) .  Nontrivial consensus rules should have nontrivial results, i.e., 
m > 1 ~ I{Cf (a ) :a  • Pm}l > 1. 
The dependencies among these properties yield a characterization of an interesting family of 
consensus rules. 
or, equivalently, 
To simplify notation, define a + f ( j )  = (~-~J a i ) / f ( j ) ,  so that (2) becomes 
x e Cy(a)  .'. :. a + f (x )  > a + f ( j ) ,  for all j c M. 
To delimit in a E Pm all parts of the same size, define, for all j E M, 
Aj (a) = min{i C M : ai = aj }, and 
pj (a) = max{/E  M : ai = aj  }. 
3. AX IOMS 
We will now investigate axiomatically the C S consensus rules of Definition 2.1, so as to charac- 
terize a superfamily of the rasp family of consensus rules which were defined and studied in [1]. 
Recall that, for any p E ~>0, rasp is the function Cf,, where the concentration function is spec- 
ified by fp(X) = ~ for all x e M (see [1, p. 223]). The function fp was picked as a simple 
example of one satisfying desired properties of monotonicity (SIN) and concavity (SCD), which 
we recall below. 
(SIN). f : M ---* ~R >° is strict ly increasing in M if  
x, y E M and z < y ~ f (x )  < f (y ) .  
(SCD).  f : M ~ N>0 is strictly concave downward in M if  
x 'yEM'x~y 'and(x+y)  m°d2=O~ f (~-~)  > f (x )+ 
Desirable properties that the Cf rules might satisfy are the following. 
EXTREME NEUTRALITY (EN).  Candidates on committees hould have more votes than candi- 
dates not on committees, i.e., 
x C C f (a )  and x < m ~ az > ax+l, 
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THEOREM 3.1. Let f : M -~ !R >° and Cy : Pm ~ H(M), the consensus rule associated with f .  
C/ satisfies (EN) and (ME) / f  and only if f satisfies (SIN) and (SCD). 
PROOF. Assume that C S satisfies (EN) and (ME). Then (SIN) is vacuously satisfied for m = 1, 
so let m > 1. For any j E M \ {m}, define 7 j = (71,... ,Tm) E Pm such that 
7i={ ~, fo r l< i< j ,  
O, for j < i <_ m. 
(3) 
(EN) implies that C I (7  j) C {j ,m},  and (ME) implies that m ¢ CI(TJ), so Cf(7 j) = {j}. Thus, 
l / f  (j) = 7 j + f ( j )  and 7 j + f ( j  + 1) = 1/ f ( j  + 1), and from (2), 
1 1 
-7  j + f ( j )  > 7 j + f ( j  + l ) -  - -  
f ( j )  f ( j  + 1)' 
so f ( j )  < f ( j  + 1). It follows that f(1) < ... < f (m)  and f satisfies (SIN). 
Now assume that f does not satisfy (SCD) and pick g, r E M such that g < r, (g+r) rood 2 = 0, 
and 
Without  loss of generality, we may assume that f(g) = O, g = O, and r is even with 
Use (EN) and (ME) to define 7 r E Pm by (3), with j = r, so that CI(7 ~) = {r}. Note that 
x 
7 r +f (x )  -- r f (x ) '  for all x E {1 , . . . , r} .  
Since 1 < r/2 < r and r/2 ~ Cs(7r), 
<,, +:(,>- 1 
2f(r /2)  f ( r ) '  
whence 
2 \2 ]  - 2 ' 
a contradiction, so that f satisfies (SCD). 
Now assume that f satisfies (SIN) and (SCD). Pick c~ c Pm and x c M such that c~x = 0. Set 
j = A~(c~) - 1. Since f satisfies (SIN) and j < x, 
1 1 
-- f ( j )  = f(j-----~ > )J("x---- ¢ = ~ -- f(x).  
Thus, x ~ C l (a  ) and so C I satisfies (ME). 
Let z E CI((~ ), so that C~z > 0 by the above argument. Define 
z 
i=1  
and set 
gz(z)  + azx  
-- - -  >0 ,  for a l l xCM.  
f (x)  
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Note that  a + f (x )  = gz(x) for x E [Az - 1,pz]. Since f satisfies (SIN) and (SCD), gz has in M 
a unique min imum at, say, #z E M;  gz(x) str ict ly decreases in [1, #z], and it str ict ly  increases in 
[#z,m]. Now, z E [Az,pz]. I f  z E [Az,pz) and z _> #z, then g~(#z) <_ gz(Z) < gz(Pz) <- g~(z), a 
contradict ion.  If z E [Az,Pz) and z < #: ,  then g~(#z) < gz(z) <_ gz(A~) < gz(A: - 1) < gz(Z), a 
contradict ion.  Thus, z q[ [A~,pz), so that  z = p~(a).  I 
COROLLARY 3.2. I fp  E ~>1, then rasp satisfies (EN) and (ME). 
COROLLARY 3.3. For c E ~ and positive integer m > 1, let f : M ~ ~>0 be such that  f (x )  = x c 
for a11 x E M,  and let C f  : Pm -~ I I (M)  be the consensus rule associated with f . C f  satisfies 
(EN) and (ME) i f  and only i f  0 < c < 1. 
Note that  (NT) follows from (EN) and (ME), and that  the proof of Theorem 3.1 shows that  
(ME) follows when f satisfies (SIN). 
THEOREM 3.4. Let f : M --* N>0 and C S : Pm --* H(M) ,  the consensus rule associated with f .  
I f  Cy satisfies (EN) and (ME), then C S satisfies (NT).  
PROOF. The result is immediate  for m = 1, so let m > 1. Consider a = (1 ,0 , . . .  ,0) E Pm, and 
03 ---- (m- l , . . .  ,m -1)  E Pro. Since Cy satisfies (EN), ql ¢ Cy(a)  C_ {1,m} and Cy(w) = {m}. Since 
C I satisfies (ME),  m g[ C I (a  ), so that  Cl (a  ) = {1}. Since m > 1, CS(a  ) = {1} ¢ {m} = CS(~),  
so that  [{Cy(a) : a E Pm}[ ) 1. l 
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